Medicare Gaps and Widow Poverty by Kathleen McGarry & Robert F. Schoeni
     Working Paper 
             
        WP 2003-065 
 








Medicare Gaps and Widow Poverty 

















University of California, Los Angeles 
and NBER  
 
Robert F. Schoeni 






Michigan Retirement Research Center 
University of Michigan 
P.O. Box 1248 








This work was supported by a grant from the Social Security Administration through the 
Michigan Retirement Research Center (Grant # 10-P-98358-5).  The opinions and 
conclusions are solely those of the authors and should not be considered as representing 
the opinions or policy of the Social Security Administration or any agency of the Federal 
Government.   
 
Regents of the University of Michigan 
David A. Brandon, Ann Arbor; Laurence B. Deitch, Bingham Farms; Olivia P. Maynard, Goodrich; 
Rebecca McGowan, Ann Arbor; Andrea Fischer Newman, Ann Arbor; Andrew C. Richner, Grosse Pointe 
Park; S. Martin Taylor, Gross Pointe Farms; Katherine E. White, Ann Arbor; Mary Sue Coleman, ex 
officio  
 
Medicare Gaps and Widow Poverty 
 
Kathleen McGarry 





Several categories of medical expenditures are not covered by Medicare, including 
prescription drugs, most nursing home stays, and extended hospital visits. Out-of-pocket 
costs for these items can be substantial, and what’s more, they are likely to be 
concentrated at the end of life. At the same time, it is well documented that poverty is 3-4 
times more common among widows than among similarly aged married women. This 
study examines the potential link between these two phenomena, asking the question: to 
what extent do out-of-pocket health care costs of a dying spouse affect the financial 
position of the survivor? We find that out-of-pocket medical spending increases 
substantially just prior to death, and that these expenditures are large relative to income 
for a large share of elderly couples. Simulations investigate the extent to which 
expansions in insurance coverage to include nursing home care or prescription drug 
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There have been tremendous improvements in the economic status of the elderly during the last 50 
years. Today, the old-age poverty rate is less than one-third of what it was in the middle of the 20
th 
Century. Yet despite these declines, poverty rates among selected groups remain high. Of particular 
note are the disproportionately high rates of poverty for widows. For the last 30 or more years, the 
poverty rate for elderly widows has persistently been three to four times higher than that for elderly 
married women. While policy makers have repeatedly expressed concern about these high rates, 
successful policy prescriptions have yet to be adopted.  To date the focus of policy makers has been 
on effecting changes in sources of income, particularly through changes in pension and Social 
Security regulations. Here we provide an alternative explanation that may operate in concert with 
changes in income: the potential for couples to spend substantial portions of their resources on the 
health care of a sick or dying spouse, leaving the surviving spouse in a precarious financial 
situation. 
The potential for large out-of-pocket medical expenditures was reduced greatly by the 
establishment of the Medicare program in 1965. Today, nearly all elderly have medical coverage 
through Medicare. Unfortunately, Medicare has sizable gaps; most notably it fails to cover extended 
hospital stays, prescription drugs, or most long-term care. Although many individuals have health 
insurance to supplement Medicare, a sizable portion of the population is left vulnerable to 
catastrophic expenditures, expenditures which frequently occur in the months just prior to death.  
These costs may be sufficiently great so as to affect the poverty status of the surviving spouse.   
Although this hypothesis has never been examined directly, it is of substantial current interest, 
particularly as policy makers consider modernizing the Medicare.  
  1In this paper we examine the distribution of medical out-of-pocket (MOOP) expenditures, 
the extent to which supplemental insurance coverage (medigap) reduces MOOP spending, and the 
magnitude of MOOP spending relative to income. We then focus on the effects of these 
expenditures on the financial well-being of the surviving spouse and simulate the impact of changes 
in Medicare coverage to look at the potential for improving the financial outcome for widows. We 
find that MOOP expenditures per dying individual are substantial, averaging $5,752 over the last 
year of life. These expenditures are approximately 40 to 50 percent greater than the expenditures 
made during the same period by similarly aged people who did not die during our window of 
observation. For lower income elderly, MOOP expenditures are very large relative to income and 
thus have the potential to have a substantial negative effect on the finances of the surviving spouse. 
Simulations imply that a significant amount of the decline in the financial well-being of the 
surviving spouse can be attributed to the out-of-pocket medical costs accruing during the decedent’s 
last illness.  We therefore argue that such expenses, and the underlying gaps in Medicare, should 
play a prominent role in policy discussions. 
Our study proceeds as follows.  Section II provides background information on alternative 
explanations for the high poverty rate of widows and describes the coverage provided by the 
Medicare program. Section III discusses the Asset and Health Dynamics Among the Oldest Old 
(AHEAD) cohort of the Health and Retirement Study, the data set we use for our analysis. The 
empirical analyses of MOOP expenditures and other factors affecting the finances of the surviving 
spouse are contained in sections IV and V. The final section summarizes the findings. 
 
II. BACKGROUND 
Several explanations for disproportionately high poverty among widows have been 
advanced in the literature, the most widely cited of which points to the potential impact of 
  2differential mortality. Because life expectancy is positively correlated with income, husbands in 
poor families will die at younger ages than husbands in rich families. At a given age then, women 
who are widowed had been in poorer families than those who remain married and thus have higher 
poverty rates (Holden, Burkhauser, and Myers, 1986; Weir, Willis, and Sevak, 2000).  
A second explanation focuses on the obvious: a fall in income following the death of a 
spouse. By law, Social Security benefits are reduced (typically by one-third) when one spouse dies 
while the poverty line falls by just over 20 percent.
1 This discrepancy likely leads to those with joint 
incomes near poverty line while married, to realize income below the poverty line in widowhood. 
Poverty stemming from this systematic change could be rectified by changing the Social Security 
benefit formula (Burkhauser and Smeeding, 1994). Similarly, private pensions often provide 
income only for the life of the covered worker and a widow could thus lose a potentially important 
component of income.  Even pensions with provisions for a survivor typically have a reduction in 
payments when one spouse dies.
2  Finally, if the deceased spouse had been employed, the earnings 
stream from this source will obviously end. Although we know of no study that has examined the 
changes in the various components of income associated with widowhood, Hurd (1990) examines 
changes in the components of wealth including changes in Social Security and pension wealth. His 
estimates suggest that 40-50 percent of the fall in wealth associated with the death of a spouse is 
due to reductions in Social Security, 15 percent to changes in pension income, and 10-15 percent to 
changes in bequeathable wealth, including housing wealth. This latter dimension of the decline in 
                                                           
1 Each spouse in a married couple has the option of collecting Social Security based on their own lifetime earnings 
history or receiving benefits equal to one-half of those of their partner. After the death of the first spouse, the survivor 
will either continue to receive benefits based on their own earnings record or can choose to collect the amount due the 
deceased spouse. Few women of the cohort that we study have a sufficient earnings history to collect Social Security 
based on their own employment. The couple’s benefit is therefore likely to be equal to 150 percent of the primary 
insurance amount of the husband and to fall to 100 percent of this amount at the death of either spouse. Thus this 
important source of income typically falls by one-third while the needs standard, as defined by the poverty line, falls by 
just 20 percent.   
2 Policy makers have long recognized the potential deleterious effects of single life pensions. Both ERISA and REACT 
represent legislative attempts to encourage the use joint and survivor pensions over single life pensions.  We know of no 
study that has investigated the success of these policies.  
  3wealth is obviously not programmatic but could be due to bequests to non-spousal heirs, funeral and 
burial costs, or as we propose here, medical expenses incurred by the deceased. 
Previous studies have shown that Medicare expenditures are highly concentrated near death 
(Garber, MaCurdy, and McClellan, 1998). Medicare spending on people in their last year of life 
accounts for 27 percent of all Medicare spending, and half of all Medicare expenditures in the last 
year of life occur within the last 60 days. Those near death have Medicare spending that is roughly 
six times larger than people who are not in their last year of life (Lubitz and Riley, 1993; Hoover et 
al., 2002).  
While Medicare covers nearly all elderly, providing insurance against many costly 
procedures and services, it does not cover all potential medical costs. The most relevant cost-
sharing components for the majority of elderly are a $100 deductible for outpatient (Part B) care 
and a 20 percent coinsurance rate on subsequent outpatient expenditures.
3 Because Part B covers 
doctor visits, nearly all elderly incurred some out-of-pocket expenditure on their way to meeting the 
deductible.
4  
Of perhaps greater importance than the $100 deductible or even the 20 percent copayment is 
the failure of Medicare to cover many potentially catastrophic expenses.  These extremely large 
expenditures can come through several avenues. First, Medicare does not cover all hospital 
expenditures. Individuals are responsible for a $840 deductible (in 2003) per hospital admission. 
After that, Medicare pays the entire cost of the hospital stay for stays up to 60 days. From days 61-
90 individuals pay a $210 per day copayment, and from 91-150 a $420 copayment. Beyond day 
150, Medicare pays nothing towards medical bills. Although few individuals ever face such 
                                                           
3 The Medicare program consists of two parts, parts A and B.  Part A of Medicare covers hospital expenses and is 
available without charge to those who have paid into the system during their working lives or who have spouses who 
are covered. Part B, broadly speaking, covers doctor visits. Enrollees pay a premium to purchase Part B coverage. The 
premium is set to equal just one-quarter of the actuarial value of the coverage. Approximately 95 percent of those with 
Part A coverage also have part B coverage (Social Security Administration, 2003).    
4 In wave 1 of AHEAD, 90 percent of respondents had at least one visit to a doctor’s office (Hurd and McGarry, 1997). 
  4extended stays, this lack of catastrophic insurance can leave seriously ill individuals with substantial 
medical bills. Two “self-paid” months of inpatient care could approach $50,000. 
Second, and currently of great concern in policy circles, Medicare lacks a prescription drug 
benefit. At a time when drugs are being prescribed with increasing frequency, this omission can be 
costly. Data from the 1996 Medicare Current Beneficiary Survey show that 45 percent of total 
prescription drug expenditures were paid for out-of-pocket while only 4 percent were covered by 
Medicare (Liu, et al., 2000). Furthermore, average out-of-pocket spending on prescription drugs 
among Medicare population is estimated to be $1,000 (in 2003). Treatment with some drugs can run 
into the tens of thousands of dollars per year, with 4 percent of Medicare beneficiaries spending 
$4,000 or more out of pocket on prescription drugs in 2003 (Kaiser, 2003).  
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, Medicare typically does not cover the majority of 
long-term care needs. Nursing homes and home health care costs can be large, with nursing homes 
averaging over $60,000 per year in 2002 (MetLife, 2002), most of which is paid for through out-of-
pocket spending or Medicaid.
5  Because of these gaps in Medicare coverage, there is a genuine risk 
that a severely ill Medicare beneficiary could incur substantial MOOP expenditures, perhaps of a 
magnitude sufficient to eliminate the savings of a couple and jeopardize the financial well-being of 
the surviving spouse. 
  Fortunately, not all elderly are left exposed to these potentially catastrophic expenditures. 
For the poor elderly additional assistance is available through the Medicaid program.
6 Medicaid 
provides coverage for most of the gaps in Medicare benefits including coverage of long-term care. 
Those who are not eligible for Medicaid may purchase private insurance (medigap) to fill in these 
holes or may receive additional insurance through a former employer as part of a retiree benefits 
                                                           
5 In 1996, 41 percent of nursing home expenses were paid for by Medicaid and 32 percent with out-of-pocket funds 
(Liu, et al, 2000).  
  5package. While medigap plans vary in the specific coverage they provide, all plans provide 
coverage for hospital copayments for days 61-150, some subsequent coverage, and the coinsurance 
for doctor visits.
7  Three of the ten standardized medigap plans cover prescription drugs, but only up 
to a specified yearly maximum. None of these medigap policies cover long-term care needs. Long-
term care coverage is available through special long-term care insurance policies, but only ten 
percent or so of the elderly have long term care insurance (Finkelstein and McGarry, 2003). Thus, 
although numerous forms of additional insurance exist, many elderly still face the possibility of 
substantial uncovered health expenditures.  
Recent estimates suggest that MOOP spending in the last year of life is very high, averaging 
$6,144 (scaled to 2003 dollars) for those near to death compared to $1,935 who survive at least one 
year (Hoover, et al., 2002). Furthermore, these out-of-pocket expenditures account for 
approximately 18 percent of all medical costs in the last year of life (Hogan, et al., 2001), 
suggesting that there is a large uninsured component. 
The 1995 National Academy of Sciences report assessing the current poverty definition 
argued that MOOP expenditures should be subtracted from income when measuring poverty (Citro 
and Michael, 1995). Given that MOOP expenditures are particularly high among the elderly, this 
change would have substantial effects on estimated poverty rates for older populations. One study 
has concluded that subtracting MOOP expenditures from income would lead to elderly poverty rates 
that are nearly twice as high as the current approach used by the Census Bureau (Johnson and 
Smeeding, 2000). Thus, even if the income of a surviving spouse remains above the poverty line, 
her true standard of living, based on income available after medical bills are paid, may be much 
                                                                                                                                                                                                 
6 Individuals are eligible to enroll in Medicaid if they have sufficiently low income and assets. The exact levels can vary 
by state. In states with medically needy programs, individuals can become eligible for Medicaid if their MOOP 
expenditures are sufficiently large even if their financial resources exceed the limits set by the state.   
7 Medigap plans are strictly regulated. Insurers are limited to offering plans from a set of 10 standardized plans that 
include specified levels of coverage. 




The data requirements for this study are extensive. Analysis of the role of MOOP 
expenditures on the financial well-being of the surviving spouse requires information on 
expenditures of the deceased spouse prior to his death and information on the income and wealth of 
both the couple and the surviving spouse. One therefore needs a panel data set with a sufficient 
number of elderly decedents and detailed information on income, wealth, and health care 
expenditures. The Health and Retirement Study (HRS) satisfies these requirements. HRS a panel 
survey that follows several cohorts of elderly and near elderly over time with interviews conducted 
approximately biennially. Because we focus on the role of Medicare, which is available to very few 
people under 65, we limit our sample to the original AHEAD cohort, and spouses or partners age 65 
or older.
8  Analyses were conducted for a combined sample of men and women who lost a spouse 
because the sample size for widows or widowers alone was insufficient for a disaggregated 
examination. Respondents in the AHEAD sample were born in 1923 or earlier (or married to 
someone in that cohort) and were therefore nearly all eligible for Medicare at the initial interview in 
1993.
9 When appropriately weighted, the sample is representative of the non-institutionalized 
population in this 70 year old or older age group in 1993.  
                                                           
8 Medicare also covers some of the disabled. In 2001 approximately 86 percent of those covered by Medicare were age 
65 or over (Social Security Administration, 2003). 
9 In addition for being too young to qualify for Medicare at the start of the survey, respondents in the original HRS 
cohort (birth years 1931-1941) were not asked adequate questions on MOOP expenditures until 1996, thus limiting the 
widow of time for which we could capture spending.   
  7The AHEAD cohort was re-interviewed in 1995, 1998, and 2000, and will be interviewed 
biennially thereafter; we use data from these first four waves.
10 Importantly for this paper, when a 
respondent dies, an “exit” interview is conducted to obtain information about the respondent’s life 
since the most recent interview (including medical expenses) until the date of death. The person 
who completes this proxy interview is typically a spouse, provided the spouse is still alive.  If the 
surviving spouse is unavailable the proxy respondent is a knowledgeable family member or friend. 
Presently exit interviews are available for 1995, 1998 and 2000. By using all available waves and 
exit interviews we are able to examine the pattern of spending for deaths occurring between 1993 
and 1995, 1995 and 1998, 1998 and 2000.  
AHEAD contains comprehensive information on income, wealth, and health status of 
respondents. Of particular importance is the measurement of MOOP expenditures. The wording of 
these questions varies slightly across waves, becoming more detailed over time. In 1993, 
respondents are asked to report MOOP spending in two categories:  nursing home expenses and all 
other health care costs.
11  In 1995, 1998 and 2000 the spending categories are disaggregated into 
hospital and nursing home expenditures, doctor/outpatient bills, prescription drug expenses, and 
other medically related services such as adult day care and rehabilitation services. Exit interviews 
also ask about hospice care. To these expenditures we add any private health insurance premiums 
and Medicare Part B premiums.
12 It should be emphasized that these are not total medical 
                                                           
10 An early release of data is available for 2002. This wave contains more detailed categories of MOOP expenditures 
than previous interviews and our investigation suggests that this change in questions severely hampers any attempted 
comparison. 
11 In the first wave of the survey expenditures for married couples are measured jointly and the survey does not identify 
which spouse incurred the costs. To estimate a per person expenditure we simply assign half of the couple’s total 
MOOP expenditures to each spouse. When focusing on married couples in which one spouse died between wave 1 and 
wave 2, we will underestimate the MOOP expenditures of the decedent if his health care costs comprised a greater than 
50 percent share of the total. Data for other years do not suffer from this limitation. 
12 For the poor elderly eligible for Medicaid, Medicare Part B premiums are paid for by Medicaid. We thus do not add 
in the cost of Medicare Part B for those reporting eligibility for Medicaid.  
  8expenditures, which would include amounts paid by Medicare and other payers, but rather the 
burden placed on the elderly individual and his spouse.  
The data on MOOP expenditures reported in AHEAD appear to be of high quality. 
Specifically, reports of MOOP in wave 2 of the HRS, which used a very similar set of questions as 
AHEAD, correspond closely with reports in the National Medical Expenditures Survey (NMES), 
which is the gold standard for estimates of MOOP expenditures (Hill and Mathiowetz, 2000). For 
example, the proportion reporting some positive amount of MOOP spending was 33.0 percent in 
NMES and 32.5 percent in HRS, and the proportion with $1-$1,000 in MOOP spending was 52.4 
percent in NMES and 58.8 percent in HRS.  
The length of time covered by the AHEAD expenditure questions varies somewhat across 
waves. In 1993 respondents were asked about expenses in the previous year. In subsequent surveys 
they were questioned about the total incurred since the previous interview. The 1995 interview thus 
covered two years of expenses, 1998 three years, and 2000 two years. For comparability we scale 
expenditures at each interview to correspond to a single year.
13 For exit interviews the adjustment is 
less straightforward. In these cases the time covered by the survey will vary by the date of death. 
We use two alternative methods, which we detail below, to deal with this difference. 
  Because AHEAD targets an older cohort, mortality is high. The left columns of table 1 show 
the number of deaths between adjacent waves for people who were and were not married in 1993. 
We require that an individual be observed in at least two interviews to be included in the sample. 
Over the seven-year sample period there are a total of 2,512 people who died, 1,138 of whom were 
married. Our analyses will compare the MOOP expenditures of these 1,138 married decedents with 
the expenditures of their surviving spouses. We will, on occasion, draw comparisons to the 
                                                           
13 We converted the reported amounts to annual values because it makes comparisons to annual income and poverty 
thresholds more straightforward. That is, if z is the number of months since the last interview, we multiple the amount 
of MOOP spending reported in the exit interview by (12/z). 
  9expenditures of single individuals and couples in which neither spouse died. The number of 
observations in these latter two categories (rightmost columns in table 1) is substantially larger, 
consisting of 2,000 to 3,000 per year. 
  
IV. OUT-OF-POCKET MEDICAL EXPENDITURES IN THE LAST YEARS OF LIFE 
Our focus is on expenditures just before death. Because AHEAD decedents die at various 
points during the 1993-2000 interval, we organize the data around the time of death rather than the 
survey year. We label as wave k the interview immediately following the death, either the exit 
interview for the decedent or the standard biennial survey for the survivor. We refer to the interview 
preceding this exit/biennial interview as period k-1, and the interview following the wave k 
interview (available for survivors only) as time k+1. Interviews taking place two periods before and 
two periods after are denoted as k-2 and k+2. Thus for a respondent who dies between 1995 and 
1998, the 1998 exit interview will provide the time k information, the 1995 interview provides the 
time k-1 data, and 1993 refers to time k-2. His spouse will have time k information reported in the 
ordinary1998 interview, k-1 at 1995, k-2 at 1993, and k+1 in 2000. Because the year of death differs 
across the sample (and because of attrition), not all respondents will have been observed in each of 
the periods from k-2 to k+2; that is, the panel is not balanced. An individual whose spouse dies 
between 1998 and 2000, for instance, will not contribute observations for the periods k+1 and k+2 
but will contribute to the k-2 and k-1 data. The number of observations thus varies across time 
periods, although we require that all sample members be observed at least at time k-1 and time k.  
Moreover, because there are typically two calendar years between each wave, wave   is 
roughly n*2 years from the last year of life. For example, expenditures in wave k-2 correspond to 
roughly 4 years prior to the last year of life, or 5 years from death. 
n k ±
  10As noted earlier, comparing MOOP expenditures for decedents with those of the survivors 
involves an additional adjustment to the data. Because decedents could have died at any point 
between the two waves, the time period over which their medical expenses were incurred can vary 
from as little as one day to as much as three years. In the empirical work that follows we use two 
alternative methods to construct a comparison. In the first, we simply compare the actual exit 
interview report with the one-year amount for the survivor. Most surveys are administered two 
years apart. If the mortality hazard is flat across this interval then the expected value of the time 
span covered by the exit interview is one year (the midpoint of the two year survey interval), 
roughly equal to the average of the one-year reports for their surviving spouses.  In fact, the average 
time for which the respondent survived is 14.7 months so this measure is not too far off, on average. 
Our second measure scales the expenditures of the survivor to match the length of time for which 
her deceased spouse survived: if the decedent lived for 18 months during the period, we multiply 
the survivor’s expenditures by 18/12 or 1.5.
14 
Panel A of table 2 shows the comparison of average MOOP expenditures for survivors and 
decedents by years before and after death. The values in the row labeled k are for our first method 
of comparison wherein the MOOP expenditures are annualized expenditures for the survivor and 
actual reports for the decedent.  In the row labeled k*, survivor expenditures are scaled to match the 
time span relevant for the deceased spouse as described above.  For surviving spouses there is a 
gradual increase over time as one might expect if health deteriorates with age, but the amounts 
across years are fairly comparable. In period k-2 the average annual MOOP expenditures is $2,315. 
By k+1 it has risen to $3,147.  
In contrast to the relatively slow but steady increase in the MOOP expenditures for 
survivors, the expenditures for decedents show a striking increase as the end of life nears, more than 
                                                           
14 The alternative is to scale the decedent’s expenditures to one year. We do not choose this option because we want a 
  11doubling from time k-2 to time k. Annual expenditures at time k-2 are $2,504 for decedents, but by 
time k-1 have risen to $3,276, already 40 percent higher than those for the survivors. This increase 
is followed by an even larger jump to $5,752 in the months just before death, an amount 70 percent 
higher than the similarly scaled value of $3,397 for their surviving spouses. This estimate is very 
similar to the estimate of MOOP in the last year of life of $5,955 (expressed in 2000 dollars) 
reported by Hoover et al. (2002) using the 1992-96 Medicare Current Beneficiary Survey and 
Medicare claims data.
15  
For comparison, in panel B we report the patterns of MOOP expenditures for couples in 
which neither spouse died during our sample period, and for singles (those who have remained 
single, widowed, or divorced throughout the survey) who likewise survive. Because there is no date 
of death to establish a “time k,” we report expenditures simply by survey year. Again the means 
increase slightly over time likely due primarily to the aging of the sample. Married couples have 
average MOOP expenditures of $1,767 in 1993 and singles $1,476. These figures are $3,469 and 
$3,151 by 2002. (The relatively low spending in 1993 is likely due to the less detailed set of 
questions used in that year, as described earlier.) Thus, the expenditures of the surviving spouse in 
the decedent couples do not look substantially different from those of the intact couples. 
Also included in the table are values for median expenditures. The substantially lower value 
of medians relative to means points to a positively skewed distribution. The medians show a much 
smaller difference in expenditures for the decedents relative to the survivors indicating that the 
majority of families are protected against catastrophic expenses, or alternatively did not make 
substantial use of uncovered services.  
                                                                                                                                                                                                 
measure of the actual out-of-pocket costs borne by the couple/survivor when we later assess economic well-being. 
15 Our finding of elevated MOOP spending near widowhood in the AHEAD is also consistent with recent estimates by 
Zick, Fan, and Chang (2003) using the Medical Expenditure Panel Survey, which examines new widows 40 and older 
over of a 2-year period. 
  12Table 3a looks at the specific type of expenditure for decedents in each period. As the end of 
life nears, the pattern of spending changes substantially. In period k-2 the largest expenditure 
components are insurance premiums and prescription drugs.  By period k, nursing home/hospital 
care has far surpassed both prescription drug costs and insurance premiums. In fact, expenditures 
for these items are twice as large as average insurance premiums.
16  
The skewness of total MOOP expenditures is reflected in the skewness of expenditures for 
nursing home and hospital care; even in period k, the median decedent has zero nursing 
home/hospital expenditures, while the 95
th percentile had nearly $15,000 in expenditures. With 
respect to prescription drug expenses, the 95
th percentile had out-of-pocket expenses of $4,945.  
These results suggest that if MOOP expenditures of a deceased spouse are an important contributor 
to the poor financial status of his survivor, more complete coverage of nursing home, hospital care, 
and prescription drugs could help alleviate the problem.   
For comparison, table 3b reports the distribution of expenses for the surviving spouses. 
(Appendix tables A and B show the corresponding amounts for surviving couples and singles.) 
There is a modest increase in nursing home, hospital, and physician services due to the aging of the 
sample. Insurance premiums are continually the largest component of MOOP spending. If this 
supplemental insurance is sold at an actuarially fair rate, then one would expect the benefits to 
approximately equal the premium costs on average.
17 Thus the large fraction of MOOP 
expenditures attributable to premiums is further evidence of the importance of the gaps in the 
Medicare program. Unsurprisingly, prescription drugs also remain a large expense suggesting that 
                                                           
16 Unfortunately AHEAD obtains only the combined amount spent on hospitals and nursing homes. Among Medicare 
beneficiaries 65 and older in 1999, out-of-pocket spending for long-term care ($28,928 million) was roughly six times 
the amount of out-of-pocket spending for combined inpatient and outpatient hospital services ($4,876 million) (Liu, 
Sharma, 2003). This leads us to believe that the vast majority of MOOP in this category is due to  long-term care. 
17 Observed premiums will actually be lower than the actuarially fair value because some policies are subsidized by 
former or current employers so the premium reported by the respondent represents some fraction of the policy’s cost. 
  13while coverage of nursing homes and longer hospital stays would help those near death, the benefits 




To formalize the patterns depicted in the descriptive tables, we estimate a series of 
regressions that allow for a more systematic quantification of the changes in MOOP expenditures as 
the date of death approaches. The regression analyses also allow inclusion of control variables and 
investigation of the extent to which various factors may reduce spending. We focus specifically on 
the role of insurance. Elderly with insurance in addition to Medicare, either medigap insurance or 
long-term care insurance, have purchased this insurance in the belief that it will “protect” them from 
catastrophic expense. Similarly, individuals who are covered by Medicaid are likely to be sheltered 
from the adverse effect of medical expenditures.  
The approach we use is similar to the one used in the program evaluation literature. The 
sample consists of all couples that were married in 1993; both the samples listed in column 1 
(couples in which one spouse died) and column 3 (couples in which neither spouse died) of table 1.  
The unit of analysis is the couple-wave; if a couple is observed for all 4 waves, they contribute 4 
observations. The standard error estimates allow for correlation within couples across waves (i.e., 









    (1) 
The baseline model is depicted in equation (1). The dependent variable is total MOOP 
spending for couple (not individual) i in wave t. The key covariates are dummy variables indicating 
                                                           
18 The analyses in tables 2 and 3 used all of the available data from each wave, which leads to an unbalanced panel. To 
examine the sensitivity to the unbalanced nature of the panel, all analyses were also conducted on the balanced panel of 
those who died between 1995 and 1998. For this sample, there is data on k-1, k , k +1, and k+2. All of the key patterns 
described above in the unbalanced panel also hold true for the balanced panel. 
  14the “distance from death.”   denotes the value of this dummy variable for a couple i at time t in 
which the spouse dies in k waves. Thus,  equals one if the current wave of observation is 2 
waves before the wave of death, with death occurring in wave k=0.  Data are available for at most 
two waves after k=0 (for a respondent who dies between the first two waves) and at most three 
waves prior to k=0 (for, a respondent who dies between the last two waves). The baseline model 
also includes race/ethnicity (non-Hispanic white, non-Hispanic black, non-Hispanic others, and 






The first set of estimates of in table 4 are the regression analog of the estimates in table 2 for 
couples that experienced a death, with the inclusion of year effects and the measure of MOOP being 
that for the couple as a whole. Thus α  is the year-adjusted average MOOP spending among couples 
in which neither spouse died.  
This specification is then augmented with controls for three types of insurance coverage: 
Medicaid, medigap, and long-term care.
20 Medicare coverage alone is the omitted category.
21 All 
three insurance indicators are measured as of the initial survey year, 1993. We examine the extent to 
which the pattern of MOOP spending in the years before and after death differs for those with and 
without insurance coverage by interacting the insurance indicator variables with  . 
k
it D
The baseline model implies that average MOOP spending among couples in which neither 
spouse died is $6,740 (model 1 in table 4).
22 The  k β  parameters demonstrate, at different points 
prior to and following death, the difference in MOOP spending between couples in which one 
spouse died and those that did not. Three waves prior to death – which is roughly seven years prior 
to death – the surviving and decedent couples did not have significantly different MOOP spending; 
                                                                                                                                                                                                 
 
19 Health care costs rose by 37 percent from 1992 to 2000 based on the CPI-medical care.  
20 Health insurance provided through a past or current employer is included in the medigap category. 
21The 146 individuals who do not report any health insurance coverage are included in this group.  
  15the coefficient estimate is small ($135) and insignificantly different from zero. Differences begin to 
arise two waves prior to death with a statistically significant difference of $692. MOOP increases 
further as death nears: the gap is $972 in the wave just prior to death, or nearly 15 percent 
(972/6740) higher than the amount spent by couples not experiencing a death. In the year of death, 
expenditures increase substantially, with a gap of $2,822, or 42 percent. Not surprisingly, a couple’s 
MOOP spending declines substantially after death because there is only one person in the “couple.” 
In fact, the estimate of -$3,270 for  2 = k β  is almost exactly half of the spending by intact couples 
($6,740), suggesting that the surviving widow’s MOOP spending returns to the level it was prior to 
death. 
Model (2) allows the estimates of  k β  to vary by insurance type as measured at baseline in 
1993. The direct effects of the insurance variables are also included, and we find that among all 
elderly couples, those with Medicaid coverage spend $1,580 less on MOOP. Those with medigap 
insurance actually have higher MOOP spending. Some of this higher spending is due to the fact that 
medigap premiums are part of MOOP spending, and these premiums are substantial, averaging 
roughly $1,300 per year (Table 3a).  
Certainly the initial decision to purchase medigap insurance is likely to be a function of 
expected medical expenses. And moral hazard will play a roll in increasing service use once the 
policy is purchased. Here we seek only to assess the extent to which supplemental insurance is 
protective in the time leading up to death, when MOOP spending is particularly high. One would 
expect couples with some type of supplemental insurance to have higher MOOP than those without 
such insurance when both are healthy simply because the cost of the health insurance premium itself 
increases MOOP. But once couples begin to experience negative health events and increase their 
demand for health care, the “protective” effect of insurance becomes relevant and is most likely to 
                                                                                                                                                                                                 
22 Recall that this figure is the total for both spouses whereas earlier values pertained to one respondent. 
  16lead to lower MOOP for the insured couples. This hypothesis is indeed supported by our empirical 
results: We find no evidence that having long-term care insurance or medigap significantly lowers 
MOOP spending in the years prior to death, but spending in the year just prior to death is 
substantially lower among those with Medicaid coverage. Specifically, the interaction of Medicaid 
with   ($4,228) fully offsets the direct effect of   ($3,008). These estimates are robust to the 
exclusion of the interactions of medigap and long-term care indicators with   (not shown in 
tables).  Medicaid clearly plays an important role in buffering the widow from the effects of large 








V. MOOP EXPENDITURES AND WIDOW POVERTY 
The estimates we have presented thus far document the dramatic increase in MOOP 
expenditures near death and therefore the potential for these expenditures to affect the financial 
well-being of the surviving widow. They do not, however, directly demonstrate how large an effect 
might be on the well-being of the surviving spouse in general, and on poverty rates in particular. 
Are these large MOOP expenditures accruing to those in the lower tail of the income distribution 
who may indeed suffer greatly? Or are the largest expenditures primarily being borne by those of 
substantial means, who may be choosing to purchase more costly care (e.g. private hospital rooms, 
more expensive nursing homes, elective surgery). In table 5 we begin to explore this question by 
examining the distribution of MOOP expenditures relative to income.  Table 5 parallels table 2, but 
instead of total MOOP expenditures, the cells report the mean and median ratio of expenditures to 
income.
23 When both spouses are alive, income is defined as the joint income of the couple in the 
calendar year preceding the interview, and MOOP expenditures is the sum of the expenditures for 
  17each spouse. For the time k income, we compare total MOOP expenditures of the couple to the 
income of just the surviving spouse. This provides a measure of the relative size of the health care 
burden as actually felt by the survivor given her new financial circumstances.
24  
  As is shown in the table, the average ratio of expenditures to income rises sharply near 
death. Prior to death the mean ratio is 0.18 to 0.23 and the median ratio is 0.11 to 0.13. Thus, on 
average, these married couples spent approximately one-fifth of their incomes on health care. In 
period k one spouse has died, and expenditures increase while income decreases. The mean ratio of 
expenditures to income thus rises sharply to 0.51. The median also rises to 0.23.  
Regardless of the overall level of income of the surviving spouse, MOOP expenditures equal 
to 20 percent or so of income are likely to affect. Unsurprisingly, once the spouse (and his 
expenditures) is gone, the ratio of MOOP expenditures to income returns to its initial level.  The 
lower portion of the table reports the relevant statistics for those respondents who were married or 
single throughout the survey period.  Expenditures as a fraction of income rises somewhat over time 




Table 6 reports the poverty rates by year for our sample of couples in which one spouse dies.  
In the periods prior to death, the poverty rate using the standard Census Bureau definition is just 4 
                                                                                                                                                                                                 
23  Goldman and Smith (2001) argue for using the ratio of the means (medians) rather than the mean (median) of the 
ratio so as to minimize the bias potentially introduced by measurement error in income. Their study uses the MCBS  in 
which the income measure is substantially inferior to those in the HRS.   
24  Recall that MOOP expenditures for the survivor are measured on an annual basis, as is income. We will later 
calculate poverty rates for this sample based on yearly income. When doing so we use the poverty threshold for a single 
person. Because the deceased’s needs are excluded from this measure, we also exclude his income.  In some cases the 
decedent was alive for a portion of the year prior to the wave k interview of the survivor. We experimented with 
including any income reported to have accrued to the decedent but found this amount to have been reported as zero in 
nearly all cases. Including the few non-zero values did not substantively change our results (mean income increases 
from $31,411 to $31,583 and there is no change in the fraction poor).    
  18percent, similar to published statistics (Dalaker and Proctor, 2000).  In period k this fraction jumps 
dramatically to 12 percent and remains high in the two years following the death of a spouse.
25,26 
These estimates highlight the fact that the majority of elderly people who are poor in widowhood 
were not poor while their spouses were alive, i.e. the sample of survivors experiencing poverty rates 
on the order of 12 percent are the same individuals who faced poverty rates of just 4 percent before 
their spouse died.  Note that despite the difficulty in measuring income and poverty at time k, 
estimates of poverty in that year are quiet similar to those in the subsequent years.  
To assess the importance of MOOP expenditures further up in the income distribution, we 
also examine the change in the fraction of couples with incomes below twice the relevant poverty 
line. This figure rises from 23 percent at time k-2 to 42 percent at time k and remains at this level 
for the rest of the sample period. 
By this official definition of poverty, surviving spouses are indeed less well-off than intact 
couples. However, because this measure takes no account of medical or other expenditures in 
determining needs, it may convey a biased estimate of economic well-being. Following a 
recommendation of the National Academy of Sciences panel (Citro and Michael, 1995), we ask 
how our assessment of well-being would change if MOOP expenditures were subtracted from 
income.  This definition of poverty implicitly assumes that all costs are paid for out of current 
income and fewer resources are thus available for consumption of other goods. With this change in 
the definition, the poverty rate in the periods prior to death (k-2 and k-1) rises from 4 percent to 
approximately 15 percent. This measure also shows a sharp spike in the year before death, reaching 
35 percent. However, unlike the standard census poverty rate, this MOOP-adjusted rate actually 
                                                           
25 The sharp jump to 18 percent poor at time k+2 is due to a change in the sample composition. That is, balanced panel 
analysis conducted separately by year of death shows similar rises in poverty between time k-1 and k (i.e., a roughly 
tripling of the poverty rate), but then relatively stable estimates of poverty between time k, k+1, and k+2.  
26 These estimates are slightly lower than published statistics for widows due in large part to the inclusion of males 
(widowers) in the sample, yet they provide a vivid demonstration of the substantial disparity between the poverty rates 
of married couples and those who have lost a spouse.  
  19falls substantially following the death of a spouse, from 35 percent to 22 percent. This fall reflects 
the abrupt decline in MOOP expenditures once the ill spouse dies. 
To isolate more directly the potential effects of medical spending of the dying spouse, we 
simulate a MOOP-adjusted poverty rate but assuming that all of the MOOP expenditures of the 
dying spouse– but not those of the survivor – are covered by other sources (perhaps a “widow’s 
insurance” that compensates surviving spouses for this burden.) That is, in calculating the MOOP-
adjusted poverty rate we subtract from income only the MOOP spending of the surviving spouse. 
MOOP-adjusted poverty rates are much lower under this scenario: in the year of death, the MOOP-
adjust rate is “just” 26 percent instead of 35 percent. Moreover, as one would expect, there is no 
recovery of the poverty rate in the period following death of the spouse.  
Table 3 showed that prescription drug costs and hospital/nursing home expenditures were 
particularly large for decedents in the period prior to their deaths. Policy makers have recently 
passed legislation providing some prescription drug coverage through Medicare and are working to 
make long-term care insurance more affordable. (E.g. special tax treatment for premiums for some 
long-term care policies has already been established.). We thus simulate the effect of changes in 
Medicare coverage along these lines. First, we analyze the effect of prescription coverage by 
assuming that no elderly person faces any out-of-pocket cost for prescription drugs. This is a more 
generous expansion of coverage than has ever been seriously considered, but nonetheless conveys 
the potential impact of expansion in coverage on poverty. Second, we look at a Medicare expansion 
that would provide complete coverage for nursing home and hospital stays. This would be the 
equivalent of a generous long-term care policy and generous medigap plan. To implement these 
simulations we subtract MOOP expenditures from income as above, but exclude from MOOP 
expenditures, in turn, the cost of prescription drugs (row 4, Table 6) and then nursing home/hospital 
  20stays (row 5 in Table 6).
27,28 With complete coverage of prescription drugs, poverty rates in the 
years prior to death fall by 21-33 percent, from 14-15 percent (in row 2) to 10-11 percent (in row 4). 
In the year of death and the subsequent two waves, the change is less dramatic, but still substantial, 
falling by 10-18 percent. The change in the fraction of the sample with adjusted incomes below 200 
percent of the poverty line also falls, but by substantially less, suggesting that the effect of covering 
prescription drugs is largest in the lower tail.  
Nursing home and long hospital stays are typically concentrated in the year just prior to 
death.  Therefore, it is not surprising that offering coverage for these services would only affect 
poverty rates very near death. In periods k-2 and k-1, the poverty rates are reduced by a single 
percentage point, while in the year of death the effect is identical to that of prescription drug 
coverage: the simulated poverty rate falls from 35 percent to 29 percent. This may be somewhat 
surprising given the very high cost of long-term care. Thus, despite the much higher cost of nursing 
home care relative to prescription drugs, coverage of prescription drugs affects many more 
individuals and thus has an equally large effect on aggregate poverty measures.
29  
 
VI. SUMMARY AND DISCUSSION 
The Medicare program has been a tremendous success and is extremely popular (Blendon, 
Brodie, and Benson, 1997).  However, it does not provide full coverage for all types of care, most 
notably very long hospital stays, prescription drugs, or most long-term care needs. These gaps leave 
many elderly vulnerable to potentially large out-of-pocket expenditures. Elderly may purchase 
supplemental insurance to cover these expenses, but the premiums for these insurance plans are 
                                                           
27 In 1993, disaggregated expenditures are not available so we assume prescription drugs and nursing home/hospital out-
of-pocket expenses are the same portion of total MOOP expenditures that they are in 1995.  
28 Note that this is a partial effect; we ignore the likely decrease in the purchase of private insurance coverage and hence 
premiums that would accompany an expansion of the Medicare program. This reduction would be expected to lower the 
MOOP-adjusted poverty rate even further. 
29 Among those who died between 1998 and 2000, 29 percent were residing in nursing homes at the time of their death.  
  21often quite costly and coverage may still be incomplete.
30  Furthermore, MOOP expenditures are 
likely to be largest near death, when negative health shocks are most common. Our study 
complements previous analyses by focusing on spending near death and shows that out-of-pocket 
spending averages roughly $6,000 in the last year of life, an amount approximately 40-50 percent 
higher than at other points in old age. We also find that elderly with Medicaid are fully buffered 
from these elevated costs and experience no higher MOOP spending in the months and years just 
prior to death than in other years in old age. This result indicates that public programs do indeed 
have the potential to shelter individuals from dramatic spikes in health care expenditures near death. 
To gauge more accurately the economic burden of these expenses, we compare MOOP 
spending to annual income. We find that MOOP spending near death, and even well before death, is 
quite high relative to income. Five to seven years prior to the death of a spouse, the average couple 
has MOOP spending equal to approximately 15 percent of their annual income. Three years prior to 
death this share rises to about 25 percent, and in the year of death MOOP spending is equal to half 
of total income, on average. If these expenditures are supported by drawing down assets, this can 
have a long-lasting impact on the financial well-being of the surviving spouse. 
Previous studies have found that accounting for MOOP spending in poverty estimates, as 
recommended by the National Academy of Sciences’ panel, leads to much higher poverty rates 
among the elderly (Johnson and Smeeding, 2000). We look at the potential effects of MOOP 
spending on poverty rates, specifically in the years just prior to death, and the likely lingering 
economic effects for surviving spouses. Because of the unusually high levels of out-of-pocket 
spending to assist a dying spouse, MOOP-adjusted poverty rates surge with the death of a spouse. 
We show further that expanding public coverage to include prescription drugs and nursing 
home/long-term hospital stays would significantly lower out-of-pocket medical spending. Complete 
                                                           
30 Separate insurance policies are needed to cover long-term care needs and even those medigap policies that cover 
  22coverage of prescription drugs expenditures would lower MOOP-adjusted poverty by 21-33 percent 
for elderly many years away from death, and by 10-18 percent among those in their last year of life. 
Alternatively, if nursing home and extended hospital stays were covered, we estimate that poverty 
rates would not be affected among those not near death, but the rates would be 17 percent lower for 
those in the last year of life. These estimates provide some guidance as to the potential effects of 
proposals to alter current programs. 
                                                                                                                                                                                                 
prescription drugs have limit on annual claims. 
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Appendix Table A. MOOP Expenditures by Type for Married Couples (in 2000 dollars) 
 
 Mean  Median  75
th Percentile  95
th Percentile 
1995        
Physician 378  141  401  1156 
Nursing home/hospital  85  0  0  169 
Prescription Drugs  750  136  678  2834 
Special Services  4  0  0  0 
Insurance Premiums  1604  625  2034  4204 
Total 2778  1876  3249  7497 
        
1998        
Physician 315  131  359  1121 
Nursing home/hospital  89  0  0  197 
Prescription Drugs  769  254  634  2586 
Special Services  20  0  0  0 
Insurance Premiums  1519  1011  2114  3915 
Total 2704  2049  3395  6589 
        
2000        
Physician 342  125  352  1250 
Nursing home/hospital  334  0  0  250 
Prescription Drugs  1032  360  1092  3600 
Special Services  19  0  0  0 
Insurance Premiums  1752  906  2206  4302 
Total 3469  2142  3856  8146 
        
 
  26 Appendix Table B. MOOP Expenditures by Type for Married Couples (in 2000 dollars) 
 
 Mean  Median  75
th Percentile  95
th Percentile 
1995        
Physician 278  85  282  1156 
Nursing home/hospital  215  0  0  565 
Prescription Drugs  803  149  678  2834 
Special Services  45  0  0  6 
Insurance Premiums  1161  625  1722  3337 
Total 2488  1669  3025  6444 
        
1998        
Physician 249  73  244  1051 
Nursing home/hospital  544  0  0  874 
Prescription Drugs  720  190  634  2586 
Special Services  69  0  0  19 
Insurance Premiums  1223  555  1798  3319 
Total 2783  1658  3079  7613 
        
2000        
Physician 259  50  250  1088 
Nursing home/hospital  982  0  0  3000 
Prescription Drugs  820  240  960  3072 
Special Services  57  0  0  22 
Insurance Premiums  1231  546  1746  3588 
Total 3151  1796  3424  8759 
 
  27Table 1. Number of Observations by Year 
 
Year  Couples with a 
death   Singles who die 
Married individuals 
without a spouse dying 
and remaining married 
Singles who did not 












1995-1998 405  480  3044  2498 
1998-2000 353  508  2391  2358 
        
Total Deaths  
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Table 2. Per Person Annual Expenditures (in 2000 dollars) 
 
    
Panel A:  Surviving Spouses  Decedent 
  Mean Median  N
† Mean Median  N
† 
k-2  2315 1492  397 2504  1609  348 
k-1  2299 1740  622 3276  1959  547 
k  2839 1823  648 5752  2217  547 
k*  3397 1703  648      
k+1  3147 1930  395      
k+2  3474 2264  184      
            
            
Panel B:  Remained Married  Remained Single 
  Mean Median N  Mean  Median  N 
1993 1767  1311  1850  1476 1082  2923 
1995 2778  1876  1722  2488 1669  2662 
1998 2704  2049  1692  2783 1658  2642 
2000 3469  2142  1719  3151 1796  2329 
            
The MOOP expenditures at time k are the surviving spouse’s annual expenditures and the total expenditures 
accrued by the decedent since the previous interview. For the decedent, the length of the period over which 
expenditures are reported can vary from one month to three years. To allow for direct comparability with 
expenditures by the decedent, the k* row reports the survivor’s expenditures at time k scaled to equal the 
length of time for which the deceased spouse was live. 
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Table 3a. MOOP Expenditures by Type for Decedents (in 2000 dollars) 
 
 Mean  Median  75
th Percentile  95
th Percentile 
Period k -2        
   Physician  330  169  401  1156 
   Nursing home/hospital  338  0  0  889 
   Prescription Drugs  1404  434  1356  4068 
   Special Services  36  0  0  16 
   Insurance Premiums  1554  625  2008  4275 
Total 2504  1609  3086  7150 
        
Period k-1        
   Physician  397  85  332  1162 
   Nursing home/hospital  800  0  0  944 
   Prescription Drugs  1101  380  1268  4068 
   Special Services  60  0  0  41 
   Insurance Premiums  1303  625  2021  3803 
Total 3276  1959  3717  9429 
        
Period k        
   Physician  399  0  150  2093 
   Nursing home/hospital  2497  0  600  14,813 
   Prescription Drugs  1000  96  800  4945 
   Special Services  196  0  0  600 
   Insurance Premiums  1282  683  1555  4972 
   Hospice  28  0  0  0 
   Other Services  185  0  0  650 
Total 5752  2217  5602  23,128 
 
  30Table 3b. MOOP Expenditures by Type for Non-Decedents (in 2000 dollars) 
 Mean  Median  75
th Percentile  95
th Percentile 
Period k -2        
   Physician  402  169  401  1356 
   Nursing home/hospital  49  0  0  71 
   Prescription Drugs  1172  136  678  4068 
   Special Services  9  0  0  0 
   Insurance Premiums  1401  625  1868  4557 
Total 2315  1492  2856  6196 
Period k -1        
   Physician  248  89  282  1051 
   Nursing home/hospital  110  0  0  634 
   Prescription Drugs  594  203  637  2586 
   Special Services  21  0  0  16 
   Insurance Premiums  1366  631  1981  3947 
Total 2299  1740  3008  6348 
Period k         
   Physician  349  113  367  1504 
   Nursing home/hospital  401  0  0  809 
   Prescription Drugs  792  240  760  3000 
   Special Services  24  0  0  0 
   Insurance Premiums  1272  733  1823  4015 
Total 2839  1823  3269  7427 
Period k +1        
   Physician  371  88  292  1463 
   Nurising home/hospital  333  0  0  792 
   Prescription Drugs  815  240  925  3000 
   Special Services  23  0  0  10 
   Insurance premiums  1559  842  1862  3954 
Total 3147  1930  3405  9107 
Period k +2        
   Physician  306  100  250  1500 
   Nuring home/hospital  476  0  0  450 
   Prescription Drugs  1110  480  1344  3600 
   Special Services  31  0  0  100 
   Insurance Premiums  1554  846  1926  3746 
Total 3474  2264  3716  9614 
  31Table 4. Effects of Supplemental Insurance Coverage on MOOP Spending for Couples 
During the Period Near Dealth of One Spouse 
 




 Coefficient  Std  Error  Coefficient Std  Error 
Constant  6740.2** 350.6  5978.8**  376.4 
Waves from death ( ) 
k




   -3  135.1  300.2  260.4  789.0 
   -2  691.8*  310.2  96.4  401.6 
   -1  971.5**  326.0  786.4  639.3 
   0 (wave of death)  2822.0**  587.9  3008.4**  1066.8 
   +1  -2955.2**  368.4  -2050.5**  722.0 
   +2  -3269.8**  557.0  -2347.1*  1431.1 
Year        
   1993  -3352.7**  365.2  -3068.3**  359.7 
   1995  -1022.8**  383.0  -733.1*  374.0 
   1998  -916.1**  349.6  -695.8*  351.4 
   2000 (reference)         
Supplemental insurance:       
  Medicare only
t (reference)        
  Has Medicaid      -1580.0*  731.4 
  Has medigap      1219.5**  292.4 
  Has long-term care     -105.7  364.4 
Medicaid*waves from death       
   -3     949.4  940.0 
   -2     -1060.4  955.3 
   -1     971.6  1518.1 
   0 (wave of death)    -4227.6**  1350.6 
  +1     1600.7  2501.0 
  +2     -1093.0  1497.2 
Medigap*waves from death     -463.1  798.4 
   -3     632.5  596.6 
   -2     -100.6  718.5 
   -1     92.5  1156.2 
   0 (wave of death)     -950.9  725.8 
  +1     -1348.2  1334.8 
  +2       
Long-term care*waves from death       
   -3      511.2  681.6 
   -2      1004.8  851.5 
   -1      1837.1  1208.6 
   0 (wave of death)      -168.8  1875.5 
  +1      -219.5  812.9 
  +2      2993.5  2022.6 
R
2  0.046 0.065 
Number of observations  6270 5973 
Both models include controls for race/ethnicity; model (2) also interacts race/ethnicity with   
k
it D.
tAlso includes 146 observations who report no health insurance coverage. * (**) indicates 
significance at the 0.10 (0.01) level. 





Couples in which one spouse dies 
  MOOP expenditures/Income     
  Mean  Median  Mean Income  Percent Poor 
k-2 0.18  0.11  37,499  4 
k-1 0.23  0.13  38,340  4 
k 0.51  0.23  31,411  12 
k+1 0.18  0.09  27,730  11 
k+2 0.18  0.10  30,690  18 
      




Couples that remained married 
  MOOP expenditures/Income     
  Mean  Median  Mean Income  Percent Poor 
1993 0.14  0.09  40,188  4 
1995 0.17  0.10  49,744  2 
1998 0.18  0.12  51,351  2 
2000 0.24  0.13  48,442  3 
      
For surviving spouses, the time k MOOP expenditures are annual expenditures while those of the 
decedent pertain to the entire portion of the interval for which he was alive.  
 
 
  33Table 6. Poverty Rates Using Alternative Assumptions 
Couples in Which One Spouse Dies 
 
  
Wave Before/After Death 
  k-2 k-1  k  (Death) k+1  k+2 
Standard Census Definition of Poverty: (1)         
  Percent poor  4 4 12  11  18 
  Percent < 200% of poverty  23 25  42 42  44 
         
MOOP Adjusted Definition of Poverty: (2)         
  Percent poor  14 15  35 22  29 
  Percent < 200% of poverty  36 37  61 51  55 
         
Same as (2), but Exclude MOOP of Dying 
Spouse: (3) 
       
  Percent poor  10 9  26  22  29 
  Percent < 200% of poverty  30  33  54  51  55 
         
Same as (2), but Assume Full Coverage for 
Prescription Drugs: (4) 
       
  Percent poor  11  10  30  18  26 
  Percent < 200% of poverty  33  34  58  49  53 
         
Same as (2): but Assume Full Coverage 
for Nursing Home/Hospital Stays: (5) 
       
  Percent poor  13  14  29  21  26 
  Percent < 200% of poverty  35  35  58  50  53 
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